Pension Fund Monitoring and Corporate Debt Policy: Evidence from the Korean Market*

Wonseok Choi; Chune Young Chung; Jongchan Park

doi:10.1111/ajfs.12331

Pension Fund Monitoring and Corporate Debt Policy: Evidence from the Korean Market*

Wonseok Choi, Chune Young Chung, Jongchan Park

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate whether the Korean National Pension Service, a corporate watchdog and major long-term investor in South Korea, positively affects corporate financial policy. The Korean National Pension Service is less likely to influence corporate financial policy even among firms with high uncertainty and information opacity, which increases the importance of large shareholders’ monitoring role. Additionally, ownership by the Korean National Pension Service has statistically insignificant effects on firms’ performance and financial soundness.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	210-237
Number of pages	28
Journal	Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies
Volume	50
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ajfs.12331
State	Published - Apr 2021

Keywords

Blockholding
Institutional monitoring
Korean National Pension Service
Korean market
Target capital structure

Access to Document

10.1111/ajfs.12331

Cite this

@article{c74e21b0a3a540aca637b649e229fa46,

title = "Pension Fund Monitoring and Corporate Debt Policy: Evidence from the Korean Market*",

abstract = "We investigate whether the Korean National Pension Service, a corporate watchdog and major long-term investor in South Korea, positively affects corporate financial policy. The Korean National Pension Service is less likely to influence corporate financial policy even among firms with high uncertainty and information opacity, which increases the importance of large shareholders{\textquoteright} monitoring role. Additionally, ownership by the Korean National Pension Service has statistically insignificant effects on firms{\textquoteright} performance and financial soundness.",

keywords = "Blockholding, Institutional monitoring, Korean National Pension Service, Korean market, Target capital structure",

author = "Wonseok Choi and Chung, {Chune Young} and Jongchan Park",

note = "Funding Information: Special thanks are owed to Vidhan Goyal (the editor) and anonymous referees. The authors contributed equally to this work. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. 2020R1G1A1100261). The standard disclaimer applies, and all errors are our own. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Korean Securities Association",

year = "2021",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1111/ajfs.12331",

language = "English",

volume = "50",

pages = "210--237",

journal = "Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies",

issn = "2041-9945",

publisher = "John Wiley and Sons Ltd",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pension Fund Monitoring and Corporate Debt Policy

T2 - Evidence from the Korean Market*

AU - Choi, Wonseok

AU - Chung, Chune Young

AU - Park, Jongchan

N1 - Funding Information: Special thanks are owed to Vidhan Goyal (the editor) and anonymous referees. The authors contributed equally to this work. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. 2020R1G1A1100261). The standard disclaimer applies, and all errors are our own. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Korean Securities Association

PY - 2021/4

Y1 - 2021/4

N2 - We investigate whether the Korean National Pension Service, a corporate watchdog and major long-term investor in South Korea, positively affects corporate financial policy. The Korean National Pension Service is less likely to influence corporate financial policy even among firms with high uncertainty and information opacity, which increases the importance of large shareholders’ monitoring role. Additionally, ownership by the Korean National Pension Service has statistically insignificant effects on firms’ performance and financial soundness.

AB - We investigate whether the Korean National Pension Service, a corporate watchdog and major long-term investor in South Korea, positively affects corporate financial policy. The Korean National Pension Service is less likely to influence corporate financial policy even among firms with high uncertainty and information opacity, which increases the importance of large shareholders’ monitoring role. Additionally, ownership by the Korean National Pension Service has statistically insignificant effects on firms’ performance and financial soundness.

KW - Blockholding

KW - Institutional monitoring

KW - Korean National Pension Service

KW - Korean market

KW - Target capital structure

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85105054245&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/ajfs.12331

DO - 10.1111/ajfs.12331

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85105054245

SN - 2041-9945

VL - 50

SP - 210

EP - 237

JO - Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies

JF - Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies

IS - 2

ER -

Pension Fund Monitoring and Corporate Debt Policy: Evidence from the Korean Market*

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this