A response to “Likelihood ratio as weight of evidence: A closer look” by Lund and Iyer

Simone Gittelson, Charles E.H. Berger, Graham Jackson, Ian W. Evett, Christophe Champod, Bernard Robertson, James M. Curran, Duncan Taylor, Bruce S. Weir, Michael D. Coble, John S. Buckleton

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations


Recently, Lund and Iyer (L&I) raised an argument regarding the use of likelihood ratios in court. In our view, their argument is based on a lack of understanding of the paradigm. L&I argue that the decision maker should not accept the expert's likelihood ratio without further consideration. This is agreed by all parties. In normal practice, there is often considerable and proper exploration in court of the basis for any probabilistic statement. We conclude that L&I argue against a practice that does not exist and which no one advocates. Further we conclude that the most informative summary of evidential weight is the likelihood ratio. We state that this is the summary that should be presented to a court in every scientific assessment of evidential weight with supporting information about how it was constructed and on what it was based.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)e15-e19
JournalForensic Science International
StatePublished - Jul 2018


  • Bayesian approach
  • Bayes’ theorem
  • Evidential weight
  • Forensic evidence interpretation
  • LR


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